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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
prosecution -is .precluded by the rule of comity. 20 Such an analysis
eliminates the "objection rule" and renders the rule of comity inappli-
cable. Thus, the same results -will be reached as are now being attained
in the great majority of cases.21 In addition, S-1 will be precluded
from objecting to S-2's exercise of jurisdiction in the few instances
where, as in the principal case, habeas corpus is sought in a court, of
S-1. On the other hand, where the party is on bail from S-1, it is sub-
mitted that there should be a strict adherence to the rule of comity in
the absence of a "real" consent by S-1. In this situation S-1 is actively
engaged in prosecuting the individual on bail, and it would seem that
in the interest of comity and the due administration of justice, S-1
should be able to proceed without interference from another sover-
eignty. _.
TAXATION-TAX COURT-POWER TO VACATE A FINAL DECISION
Lasky v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. granted,
25 U.S.L. Week 3133 (U.S. Aug. 31, 1956) (No. 371)
Four months after a decision' had been rendered, the taxpayer filed
a motion in the tax court to vacate the decision and to grant a rehear-
ing, on the ground of excusable neglect of counsel. Although the
Internal Revenue Code provides that a decision of the tax court be-
comes final after expiration of the three-month period allowed for
filing a petition for review,2 the tax court concluded that extraordi-
nary circumstances existed which warranted granting the motion. On.
rehearing the tax court again held for the Commissioner' and the tax-
payer filed a timely petition for review in the court of appeals. The
court, in dismissing the petition for review, held that since the first
decision of the tax court had become final under the statute, the tax
court as an administrative agency had no inherent power to vacate
such a decision; and hence, the court of appeals was without jurisdic-
tion to review the second decision.4
The result in the principal case is consistent with the majority of
cases dealing with the power of the tax court to vacate a decision after
the expiration of the period for review.5 These cases, however, in
20. See Strand v. Schmittroth, 233 F.2d 598, 610 (9th Cir. 1956) (dissenting
opinion) ("One can be subject to a court's orders without being in the full 'custody
of the law,' without having a protective casing of immunity.").
21. See text supported by notes 7-8 supra.
1. Bessie Lasky, 22 T.C. 13 (1954).
2. INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, §§ 7481(1), 7483.
3. Bessie Lasky, P-H 1955 T.C. Mem. Dec. 55254-A.
4. Lasky v. Comm'r, 235 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. granted, 25 U.S.L.
WEEK 3133 (U.S. Aug. 31, 1956) (No. 371).
5.- White's Will v. Comm'r, 142 F.2d 746 (3d Cir. 1944); Monjar v. Comm'r,
140 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1944); McCarthy v. Comm'r, 139 F.2d 20 (7th Cir. 1943?;
Denholm & McKay Co. v. Comm'r, 132 F.2d 243 (1st Cir. 1942); Swall v. Comm r,
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denying the tax court the power to vacate, do not consider whether
the nature of the tax court is administrative or judicial. The basis of
the majority view is that the statute applies not only to the permis-
sible period for review, but also to the length of time during which the
tax court has the power to vacate, amend, or modify.6 In several of
these cases the courts have referred to a senate committee report7
which points out that the purpose of the statute is to provide a definite
date for tax court decisions to become final so that the Commissioner
can initiate suits for collection and the statute of limitations can be-
gin to run. The majority also rely upon a Supreme Court decision:
that construed the effect of the word "final" under another sub-section
of the statute involved in the principal case. That sub-section provides
that a decision of the tax court becomes final upon the expiration of
thirty days from the date of issuance of a Supreme Court mandate
affirming the tax court decision or dismissing the petition for review2
The Court held that it could not grant a petition for rehearing after
the thirty-day period.' The courts adhering to the majority view
draw the analogy that if the Supreme Court does not have the power
to reconsider a tax court decision after the thirty-day period, then the
tax court has no such power after the three-month period.1
The minority view is composed of two decisions. First, an early
fifth circuit decision'! held that the tax court could vacate a decision
final under the statute and compared tax court decisions to decisions
of the Departments of Labor and Interior, which although declared
to be final by statute are subject to further inquiry by the department
and the courts. Second, a recent sixth circuit decision" stated that as
a practical matter the tax court is a judicial tribunal, and therefore
it has the inherent judicial powers of a court. Thus, it was held that
the tax court could vacate a final decision because it could exercise a
power similar to the inherent power of a court to grant a writ of
error coram nobis.
122 F.2c :324 (9th Cir. 1941); Sweet v. Comm'r, 120 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1941);
Jacob Bros. Co. v. Comm'r, 64 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1933); J. S. Rippel & Co., 36
B.T.A. 78 (1937); St. Petersburg Land & Loan Co., 26 B.T.A. 530 (1932).
0;. l,}1.
7. S. Rep. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1926), quoted in the principal case,
2-- F.24 at 100.
.Hulveinz v. Northern Coal Co., 292 U.S. 191 (1934).
'. Revenue Act of 1926, § 1005 (a) (4), 44 STAT. 111 (now INT. REV. CODE OF
1!))4, § 7481(2) (C)).
Wo. See also R. Simpson & Co. v. Comrn'r, '121 U.S. 225 (1944), where the
Su!, eme Court held it was without jurisdiction to grant a petition for rehearing
since the tax court decision was final under Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 1140(b) (2),
,3 STAT. 163 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7481(2) (B)).
11. See, e.g., Sweet v. Comm'r, 120 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1941).
12. La Floridienne J. Buttgenbach & Co. v. Comn'r, 63 F.2d 630 (5th Cir.
13. Reo Motors, Inc. v. Comm'r, 219 F.2d 610 (6th Cir. 1955). This decision
ha- been commented on in the following reviews: 24 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 606(1)956); 69 HARV. L. REV. 577 (1956); 40 MINN. L. REV. 624 (1956); 41 VA. L.
Ri:%. 671 (1955).
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The court in the principal case did not consider the analogy em-
ployed in the fifth circuit opinion. However, it expressly rejected the
reasoning of the sixth circuit and stated that since the tax court is
by statute not a court at all, but merely an administrative agency,14 it
does not have the inherent power to vacate a final decision. Further,
the principal case points out that while such power is provided for in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the federal rules do not apply
to administrative agencies.
Although the principal case is consistent with the majority of de-
cisions with respect to the power of the tax court to vacate a final
decision, its view of the tax court as a mere administrative agency
conflicts with other decisions where the problem of the nature of the
tax court has arisen in connection with other issues. For example, it
has been pointed out that the tax court operates solely as a judicial
tribunal adjudicating tax liabilities ;16 its function is not administra-
tive, investigatory, or regulatory;1 its proceedings are entirely de
novo ;18 its scope of review is identical with like decisions of federal
district courts ;19 and it can compel attendance of witnesses and pro-
duction of documents. 20 In many decisions it has been stated that the
tax court is judicial in character and exercises judicial powers. 21
However, Congress has refused to act on the recommendations of the
Hoover Commission and bills which have been proposed to remove the
tax court from the executive branch of the government.22
14. The tax court is "an independent agency in the Executive Branch of the
Government. . . ." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7441.
15. A federal district court has the power to vacate a final judgment for one
year after judgment is entered. FED. R. Civ. P. 60 (b).
16. See Stern v. Comm'r, 215 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1954).
17. Ibid.
18. See SURREY & WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 48 (1955).
19. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7482(a).
20. Id. at § 7456 (a).
21. See Kay v. Comm'r, 178 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1950); Pelham Hall Co. v.
Hassett, 147 F.2d 63, 66 (1st Cir. 1945); Helvering v. Continental Oil Co., 68
F.2d 750 (D.C. Cir. 1933); Underwood v. Comm'r, 56 F.2d 67 (4th Cir. 1932)
(executive board exercising judicial powers); Uncasville Mfg. Co. v. Comm r,
55 F.2d 893 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 545 (1932). In the eighth circuit,
see Garden City Feeder Co. v. Comm'r, 75 F.2d 804, 806 (8th Cir. 1935) (admin-
istrative board exercising judicial powers) (dictum). But see Helvering v. Ward,
79 F.2d 381, 382 (8th Cir. 1935) (executive board, not a court).
The fifth and ninth circuits hold that the tax court is purely administrative
in nature. See Hutchings-Sealy Nat'l Bank v. Comm'r, 141 F.2d 422 (5th Cir.
1944) ; Jones v. Comm'r, 103 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1939) ; note 4 supra.
The Supreme Court has not been uniform in its interpretation of the nature of
the tax court. See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716, 725 (1929)
(administrative); Goldsmith v. B.T.A., 270 U.S. 117, 121 (1926) (quasi-judicial);
Blair v. Oesterlein Mach. Co., 275 U.S. 220, 227 (1927) (judicial).
22. See Gribbon, Should the Judicial Character of the Tax Court Be Recog-
nized? 24 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 619 (1956). Apparently the bills failed because of
resistance from the Internal Revenue Service and certified public accountants, i.e.,
Internal Revenue counsel would not represent the government since Department
of Justice counsel handle federal court litigation, and C.P.A.'s would not be able
to represent taxpayers. Id. at 621.
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It is submitted that the view of the sixth circuit decision-that the
tax court is a judicial tribunal-is consistent with the intended impar-
tial character of the tax court as a tribunal hearing controversies in-
volving large sums of money and with an apparent trend toward rec-
ognizing the tax court as a part of our judicial system. However, the
holding of the principal case-that the tax court does not have the
power to vacate a final decision-conforms to the sound statutory pur-
pose of fixing a date after which payment of taxes cannot be deferred.
Neither the sixth circuit decision nor the principal case recognize that
both judicial and administrative tribunals have the power to vacate,
amend, or modify their decisions. 23 Thus, both the sixth circuit de-
cision and the principal case would seem to have made an unnecessary
distinction in basing their results on the nature of the tax court. Re-
gardless of the nature of the tax court, it would appear that the legis-
lative intent in setting a definite date for amounts due the government
should control. Therefore, when deciding the principal case, it should
be unnecessary for the Supreme Court to consider the nature of the
tax court. In the light of the desirability of the statutory purpose,
should the Supreme Court reverse the principal case, it is submitted
that Congress ought to declare specifically the duration of the tax
court's power to vacate.
23. See DAVis, ADMIISTRATIvE LAW § 178 (1951).
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